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List of Variables and Parameters
A total factor productivity
B borrowing of the representative entrepreneur
CW consumption of the representative worker
CE consumption of the representative entrepreneur
G government expenditures
I investments of the representative entrepreneur
K capital stock of the representative entrepreneur
L number of employed workers
N number of atomistic workers
r periodic risk-free interest rate
Q stock of debt of the representative entrepreneur
SW savings of the representative worker
TC consumption tax rate
TL labor income tax rate
Tπ capital income tax rate (including tax on interest income)
UW utility of the representative worker
UE utility of the representative entrepreneur
W wealth of the representative worker




Y Gross Domestic Product
Z unemployment benefit
α relative bargaining power of the labor union
β discount factor for the whole population
γ borrowing cost parameter
δ depreciation rate of capital
η production function parameter determining the distribution of income be-
tween labor and capital
θ distribution parameter between the representative worker’s consumption
and the government expenditures in the representative worker’s utility
function
κ investment cost parameter
µ weight parameter for the amount of employed workers in the labor union’s
function
ν weight parameter for the difference between the wage rate and the unem-
ployment benefit in the labor union’s function
πE operative profit of the representative entrepreneur
ρ rate of time preference
σ production function parameter expressing the elasticity of factor substitu-
tion
ϕ weight parameter for status in the representative worker’s utility function
χ elasticity of substitution between the representative worker’s consumption




Finland is generally considered as an example of a society with high taxation.
It is therefore interesting to investigate what the effects of a lower level of
taxation would be. Additionally, it could be interesting to investigate the
results of decreased public expenses combined with a lower general level of
taxation. My research topic is how reforming the tax code, combined with
possible changes in public expenditures, impacts macroeconomic variables,
including the welfare of individuals.
In the USA, President Ronald Reagan’s tax reform, ”The Tax Reform Act
of 1986”, simplified taxation for persons and companies.1 In contrast, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton’s reform, ”Taxpayer Relief Act”, complicated the system2.
President Donald Trump’s reform, ”Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”, temporarily
decreased personal income tax rates and permanently decreased the corpo-
rate tax rate3.
In Europe, there were substantial changes in the tax systems during the
1990s. The Baltic countries introduced various forms of flat tax systems4.
This is described in, for example, Hall and Rabushka (1983). The system
can simply be a flat tax for all kinds of income, personal or corporate, or
refined with various deductions. In Finland, the corporate tax was lowered
from 24.5 to 20 percentage in 2014.5.
The literature dealing with taxation is very extensive. In practice the dif-
ferences between articles concern the wage setting in the labor market and
whether an economy is open or closed. Altig et al. (2001) and Aronsson and
Schöb (2017) assume a perfectly competitive labor market. Dı́az-Giménez
and Pijoan-Mas (2011) differ from these with the assumption that the la-
bor supply is subject to an idiosyncratic stochastic process. Aronsson et al.
(2002), Aronsson and Sjögren (2003) as well as Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a)
1Chamberlain (2006).
2Altig et al. (2001).
3Tax Foundation (2017).
4European Central Bank (2007).
5Taxpayers Association of Finland (2018).
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examine the case of monopoly labor unions. Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b),
Aronsson and Wikström (2011) as well as Hummel and Jacobs (2016) exam-
ine wage negotiations between representatives of employees and employers.
Aronsson and Sjögren (2003) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b) consider
an open economy. The former paper assumes that goods are traded, while
the latter assumes that firms can move their production abroad.
Altig et al. (2001) simulate the impact and efficiency of various tax regimes
by a dynamic macroeconomic model. They consider households, firms and
the government in an intragenerational setup, focusing on the consequences
of a proportional income tax, a proportional consumption tax and flat taxes.
In that setup, there are ”winners” and ”losers”. The conclusion is that in
some cases retired people lose when the situation of future generations is im-
proved. In other cases middle- and upper-income citizens will be better off
and current and future poor people will suffer. In line with the article, the
big question is ”are the gains to the winners worth the costs to the losers?”.
Aronsson et al. (2002) use a general equilibrium model where the labor
unions determine the wages. The agents are the households, labor unions,
the firms and the government. The tax revenue is returned to the house-
holds as a lump sum and the size of the population is exogenous. Their
paper examines the effects of the progressivity of taxation in the economy.
The conclusion is that real wages are increased and other variables such as
working time, employment, output and consumption are decreased.
Aronsson and Sjögren (2003) use a model of a small economy, where the
world market determines the prices of products. The players are the con-
sumers with two levels of productivity, deciding about the labor supply, the
firms deciding about the labor demand, the labor unions deciding about the
wages and the government choosing the tax rates and the public expendi-
tures. They show that with low unemployment benefits, the level of provided
public goods should be increased and the commodity taxes decreased. Fur-
thermore, if the wage ratio between the two consumer types changes, the
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labor input of the consumer types reacts similarly.
Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a) use a general equilibrium model of a unionized
economy. The agents are three types of consumer - firm owners as well as
employed and unemployed workers - identical firms, labor unions and the
utilitarian government. Labor is the only input in production and the labor
unions decide either the wage rates or the wage and the number of working
hours. The paper shows that if the labor unions set only the wages and the
income tax is unrestricted, the free market solution, including zero marginal
income tax, can be implemented. On the other hand, if the income tax is
restricted, there will be unemployment and a progressive tax on labor income.
In Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b), the wage is determined through negoti-
ations between the labor unions and firms. The article considers different
countries that coordinate their policy concerning taxation, the support of
unemployed households and public production. If such a coordination in-
creases leisure time for workers, possibly combined with decreased financial
support for the unemployed, welfare will also increase.
Dı́az-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2011) describe a modified neoclassical growth
model where the households are heterogeneous and cannot insure themselves
against idiosyncratic risks. The authors study the effects of various flat-
tax reforms on the distribution of income and the welfare of individuals in
a model economy. Dı́az-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas assume stochastic aging
and retirements to shape features connected to the life-cycle of individu-
als. The government taxes capital income, labor income, consumption and
estates. The taxes are spent on the benefits given to retired households
and on government consumption. The authors show that progression on the
consumption-based flat tax increases the government income and supports
the weakest people in the society.
Aronsson and Wikström (2011) examine the impact of the concentration
of wage settlement on the progressivity of the labor income taxation. The
utilitarian government applies an unrestricted tax of profits as well as a pro-
6
gressive tax on working income. The paper shows that with a decentralized
wage setting, the free market solution is attainable, in contrast to the cen-
tralization, which leads to unemployment and a progressive taxation.
Hummel and Jacobs (2016) analyze an economy with workers, trade unions,
owners of firms and the government. The labor market is unionized, work-
ers face heterogeneous labor participation costs and the wage rate depends
on the type of work. Workers decide if they want to take part in the labor
market. Workers in different sectors belong to different labor unions. The
owners of the firms possess a capital stock and hire different types of labor.
The trade unions and the owners of the firms bargain over the wages. It
is shown that as labor unions often raise the wages above the market level,
the result is involuntary unemployment. Furthermore, with a higher level of
unionization of the labor market, the optimal income tax is lower.
Aronsson and Schöb (2017) use a general equilibrium overlapping-generations
model that contains consumers, firms and a government. A consumer lives
for three periods and tends to make irrational decisions, which the govern-
ment tries to correct by adjusting the marginal labor income tax rate as well
as taxes on savings. These tools are generation-specific.
In this paper, I establish a macroeconomic model that consists of hetero-
geneous households, firms, labor market organizations and the government.
There are two types of households - workers and firm owners. In the model,
the firm owners and the firms are merged into one agent, entrepreneurs. The
labor market organizations - the labor union representing the workers and
the employers’ federation representing the entrepreneurs - bargain over the
wages and the level of employment. Hence, the labor market is neither per-
fect nor based on a monopoly labor union.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), Yépez (2017) and Vachadze (2018),
I assume an imperfect capital market where borrowing is subject to a risk
premium. Furthermore, I assume an open economy with the possibility to
import or export capital. My contribution to the literature is that I combine
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imperfect labor and capital markets with an open economy.
The model is described in chapter 2 and in chapter 3, I present the val-
ues used for calibrating the model. In chapter 4, I collect the results and
discuss them. Finally in chapter 5, I draw conclusions of this research.
2 Description of the Model
The model is solved as a Stackelberg game6. I normalize the price of the
single good at 1.
2.1 Workers
There is an exogenous large number N of atomistic workers, who are either
employed or unemployed. Together they form a representative worker. An
employed worker supplies one unit of labor during one period and earns a
working income w. The number of workers employed by the entrepreneurs
in a period is L. The unemployed worker receives an unemployment benefit
Z, paid by the government.
The representative worker accumulates wealth W and saves SW in one period.
Thus, the wealth accumulation equation is
W+1 = W + SW . (1)
The representative worker receives the interest on the accumulated wealth
at the end of each period. The periodic risk-free interest rate is r ∈ [0,∞).
Hence, the value of the interest income is rW .
The consumption of the representative worker in one period is denoted by
CW , which is taxed at the rate TC . The labor income is taxed at the rate TL.
The unemployment benefit is not taxed. The representative worker pays a
tax Tπ on the received interest income. The tax rates are assumed to fulfill
6I denote variables with the subscript +n, n indicating the difference between the period
concerned and the present one.
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the condition TC , TL, Tπ ∈ (−∞, 1).
Consequently the budget constraint of the representative worker is
(1− Tπ)rW + (1− TL)Lw + (N − L)Z = (1 + TC)CW + SW . (2)
Given equation (1), the budget constraint (2) can be rewritten as















The representative worker derives utility from its own consumption CW , the
government expenditures G and its status7 in society, which for technical
reasons is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio between between
its own average wealth W
N
and the workers’ median wealth W , which a single
worker takes as given. The representative worker’s periodic utility function
in a period is
UW (CW , G,W,N,W ) = [θC
χ−1
χ




χ−1 + ϕ ln
W
NW
= CWf(g) + ϕ(lnW − lnN − lnW ),
(5)
where θ, χ ∈ (0, 1), ϕ > 0 and g = G
CW
, which is taken as given8. Parameter θ
is the distribution parameter between the representative worker’s consump-
tion and the government expenditures, while χ expresses the constant elas-
ticity of substitution between the representative worker’s consumption and
7Following Futagami and Shibata (1998), the status is here used in order to separate
the interest rate r from the rate of time preference ρ, guaranteeing the existence of a risk
premium in borrowing.
8The definition of g here describes the congestion of government expenditures relative
to the workers’ consumption. The more an individual uses public services, the greater is
its benefit from those services. A similar model has been used by Chatterjee and Ghosh
(2011) and Gómez (2014).
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the government expenditures9. The function f(g) is defined as





The periodic utility (5) is discounted by the factor β = 1
1+ρ
, where ρ > 0 is
the constant rate of time preference.
In each period, the representative worker chooses the new level of wealth,
W+1 in order to maximize its lifetime utility. The maximization is solved by
dynamic programming. When choosing W+1, the variables TL, Tπ, TC , r, Z,
g, W and W are taken as given. Based on (4) and (5), the maximization
problem becomes




CWf(g) + ϕ(lnW − lnN − lnW )




where VW is the value function of the representative worker. The maximiza-
tion is carried out in Appendix B.2.
The savings decision of the representative worker determines its consumption














The entrepreneurs are atomistic. Together they form a representative en-
trepreneur. The representative entrepreneur possesses the capital stock K.
This is built up by the entrepreneur’s investment I in one period. The accu-
mulation of capital by the entrepreneurs follows the equation
K + I = K+1 + δK, (9)
9Restricting χ to the interval (0, 1) guarantees that the representative worker’s con-
sumption and the government expenditures are complements.
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or equivalently
I = K+1 − (1− δ)K, (10)
where δ is the constant depreciation rate of capital, δ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the in-
vestments equal the difference between the successive period’s capital stock,
K+1, and what is left of the previous period’s stock after depreciation.
The cost of investment I is defined as a function D of the ratio between










where κ ≥ 0 is a parameter.10
The investments are financed by borrowing from the capital market and
retained profits. In one period the representative entrepreneur borrows the
amount B and the stock of debt is Q. The representative entrepreneur’s ac-
cumulation of debt between two successive periods can be described by the
following equation:
Q+1 = Q+B, (12)
where the value of the new total debt is Q+1.
The representative entrepreneur faces a risk in its borrowing. Therefore,
the interest rate related to the debt is defined as a function H of the risk-
free interest rate r as well as of the ratio between the amount of debt and
the capital stock in a period. The interest rate paid by the representative











where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter. An increase of the ratio of the borrowed capital
to the existing capital stock increases the borrowing interest rate11.
10This follows from Nickell (1978) as well as from Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002).
The concavity of the adjustment costs of investments guarantees a unique and stable
equilibrium.
11This follows from Yépez (2017). The concavity of the risk premium when borrowing
guarantees a unique and stable equilibrium.
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The representative entrepreneur produces a homogeneous final good using
the production technology F (A,K,L), which exhibits constant returns-to-
scale with regard to the capital stock K and the labor demand L. The
production function F (A,K,L) is defined as
F (A,K,L) = A[ηK
σ−1





where A > 0 and η, σ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters. Parameter A expresses the
total factor productivity, η the distribution parameter between labor and
capital and σ is the constant elasticity of factor substitution.
The partial derivatives of the production function F (A,K,L), given by equa-
tion (14), with regard to K and L are denoted by the corresponding sub-
scripts, e.g. FK(A,K,L) =
∂F (A,K,L)
∂K
. The same pattern concerns second as
well as cross partial derivatives.12
I assume the good to be the numeraire. Then, the representative entrepreneur’s
revenue equals the output, i.e.
Y
.
= F (A,K,L), (15)
while the operative profit of the representative entrepreneur is defined as the
difference between the output and the labor costs, i.e.
πE
.
= F (A,K,L)− wL. (16)
The labor costs as well as the costs of investments and accumulated debt are
deducted from the sum of the gross income and new loans. The remaining
part of the gross income is taxed at the rate Tπ, where Tπ ∈ (−∞, 1). The
consumption of the representative entrepreneur is denoted by CE and is as-
sumed to be taxed at the rate TC .
The budget constraint of the representative entrepreneur is
(1− Tπ)
[














= (1 + TC)CE.
(17)
12The partial derivatives are calculated in Appendix B.
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Based on equations (10) and (12), equation (17) can be rewritten as
(1− Tπ)
[
F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(











F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(






The representative entrepreneur’s utility is a logarithmic function of its own
consumption, i.e.
UE(CE) = lnCE. (20)
The periodic utility is discounted by the factor β = 1
1+ρ
, where ρ > 0 is the
rate of time preference.
In one period the representative entrepreneur, which maximizes its lifetime
utility, chooses the next period’s capital stock K+1 and debt level Q+1. The
maximization is solved by dynamic programming. When choosing K+1 and
Q+1, the variables Tπ, TC , r, Q and K are taken as given. Based on (19) and
(20), the maximization problem takes the following form:








where VE is the value function of the representative entrepreneur. The max-
imizations are carried out in Appendix B.2.
The decision of the representative entrepreneur regarding the capital stock,
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K+1(K,Q, Tπ, TC , r), is described by the following equation:










αµYK,+1 + (1− α)YLK,+1L+1
)
(αµ+ 1− α)(YL,+1 − w+1) + (1− α)YLL,+1L+1
− ανYK,+1


























where the expressions for YK,+1
.
= FK(A+1, K+1, L+1), YL,+1
.
= FL(A+1, K+1, L+1),
YLL,+1
.
= FLL(A+1, K+1, L+1) and YLK,+1
.
= FLK(A+1, K+1, L+1) are based on
the CES production function, given by equation (14).
The representative entrepreneur’s decision regarding the stock of debt,
Q+1(Q,K, Tπ, TC , r), is described by the following equation:
(1− Tπ)(1 + ρ)CE,+1(1 + TC,+1)
= (1− Tπ,+1)CE(1 + TC)
(







Decisions on the labor market are determined through collective bargain-
ing between the labor union, representing the workers, and the employers’
federation, representing the entrepreneurs. The labor market organizations
bargain over the wage and the number of employed workers.
The labor union observes the representative worker’s rent M as a function
of the wage w, the labor income tax TL, the unemployment benefit Z and
the level of employment L. This rent is defined as the economic gain from
working, i.e. how much more money the representative worker earns being
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employed instead of unemployed, i.e.
M(TL, w, Z, L) =
[
(1− TL)w − Z
]ν
Lµ, (24)
where ν, µ > 0 are parameters.
The employers’ federation considers the representative entrepreneur’s opera-
tive profit πE, given by equation (16). The wage and the number of workers
to be employed are simultaneously determined by an alternative-offers game
between the labor union and the employers’ federation13. The solution of the
game is obtained, following Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), by maximizing
the geometric average of the parties’ utilities, i.e.
α ln
{[




+ (1− α) lnπE
= αν ln
[
(1− TL)w − Z
]





where the constant α ∈ (0, 1) characterizes the relative bargaining power of
the labor union. The maximizations are carried out in Appendix B.1.
The maximization with respect to w gives the optimal wage as a function
of the representative entrepreneur’s capital stock K and the unemployment
benefit Z. The wage function w(K,Z) is defined by the following equation
αν(1− TL)(Y − wL)− (1− α)L
[
(1− TL)w − Z
]
= 0, (26)
where the expression for Y
.
= F (A,K,L) is given by equation (14).
The maximization with respect to L gives the optimal number of employed
workers as a function of the representative entrepreneur’s capital stock K.
The labor function L(K) is defined by the following equation
αµ(Y − wL) + (1− α)(YL − w)L = 0, (27)
where the expressions for Y
.
= F (A,K,L) and YL
.
= FL(A,K,L) are based
on the CES production function, given by equation (14).
13The data used in this paper are more suitable for calculations based on an efficient
bargaining than on a right-to-manage model.
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Substituting the optimality condition (27) into (26), gives the following com-
bined optimality condition
ν(1− TL)(YL − w) + µ
[
(1− TL)w − Z
]
= 0, (28)
where the expression for YL
.
= FL(A,K,L) is based on the CES production
function, given by equation (14).
2.4 The government
The government collects taxes from the workers and the entrepreneurs. The
taxes, paid by the representative worker, are
TπrW, TLLw and TCCW .
The taxes, paid by the representative entrepreneur, are
Tπ
[
F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(





It is to be noted that the workers’ interest income and the entrepreneurs’
profit are taxed at the same rate Tπ.
The expenditures for the government are the public expenditures G and
the unemployment benefits (N −L)Z, paid to the unemployed workers. The
tax rates (Tπ, TL, TC) and the public expenditures G are exogenous. The
government’s budget constraint is
TπrW + TLLw + TCCW + Tπ
[




−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(





= G+ (N − L)Z,
(29)
where the production function F (A,K,L) is given by (14).
16
2.5 Capital and goods markets
The stock of assets in the capital market is based on the representative
worker’s current wealth W > 0, the current net amount of foreign capi-
tal X and the representative entrepreneur’s current stock of debt Q > 0.
Hence, the capital market is defined by the equation
W +X = Q. (30)
The total income of the economy is based on the net value of foreign cap-
ital X+1 − X and the value of the production of goods F (A,K,L). The
total expenditures are based on the value of interest costs of foreign capital
rX, the value of private consumption CW and CE as well as of government








of the single-good market in the open economy is




+K+1 − (1− δ)K +




2.6 Description of the steady state
The model is examined in the steady state of (3), (5), (8), (18), (20), (22),
(23), (28), (29), (30) and (31).
3 Calibration
The model is calibrated based on data received from the Federation of Un-
employment Funds in Finland (2018), the Finnish Tax Administration (2016,
2018), Statistics Finland (2018) and the Taxpayers Association of Finland
(2017). The values, mentioned in Table 2, for parameters δ, η, σ and ρ are
based on the paper of Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2014). In order to simplify
the calculations, the labor income tax is assumed to be 30 % and the con-
sumption tax rate to be 24 %, which is the general rate applied in Finland.
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For simplicity I have fragmented the data on consumption and wealth with
the assumption that the highest quintile represents the entrepreneurs. This
assumption is reasonable as wealth and income level, following Headey and
Wooden (2004), correlate when measuring the households’ standard of living.
The real values used in the calibration are shown in Table 1 below and the
parameter values in Table 2 below. It should be noted that the euro-values
are calibrated based on the Gross Domestic Product being normalized at 1.
Table 1: Real values used for calibration
Symbol Description Value
Y ∗ Gross Domestic Product 1
K∗ entrepreneurs’ capital stock 1.32519
C∗W workers’ consumption 0.31005
C∗E entrepreneurs’ consumption 0.14650
W ∗ workers’ wealth 0.88494
W
∗
worker’s median wealth 3.04189 ×10−7
Q∗ entrepreneurs’ stock of debt 0.30342
G∗ public expenditures 0.24090
w∗ wage rate 1.88962 ×10−7
Z∗ unemployment benefits 1.13377 ×10−7
L∗ entrepreneurs’ labor demand 2452400 persons
Table 2: Parameter values used for calibration
Symbol Description Value
T ∗L labor income tax rate 30 %
T ∗π capital income tax rate 20 %
T ∗C consumption tax rate 24 %
α wage negotiation power of workers 0.5
δ depreciation rate 0.05
η income share of capital 0.423




ρ rate of time preference 0.06
σ elasticity of substitution between K and L 0.6735
χ elasticity of substitution between C∗W and G
∗ 0.5
18
The values received by the calibration are shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Calibrated values
Symbol Description Value
A∗ total factor productivity 0.12825
r∗ real interest rate 0.78644 %
N∗ workers’ labor supply 2933120 persons
γ entrepreneur’s borrowing parameter 0.22770
κ entrepreneur’s investment parameter 140.63737
µ labor union weight parameter for labor 0.06219
ν labor union weight parameter for wage 0.00891
ϕ worker’s status parameter 0.03406
4 Results
Based on the introduced model, I simulate four alternative tax reforms, com-
bined with decreased government expenditures. The original situation and
the reforms are described in Table 4 below, noting that G is based on the
Gross Domestic Product being normalized at 1:
Table 4: Tax reforms and government expenditures
Instrument start reform 1 reform 2 reform 3 reform 4
T ∗L 30 % 25 % 30 % 30 % 25 %
T ∗π 20 % 20 % 19 % 20 % 19 %
T ∗C 24 % 24 % 24 % 22 % 22 %
G∗ 0.24090 -0.33 % -0.33 % -0.33 % -1 %
The model of this paper shows that there are a number of positive effects
of reforms 1, 2 and 3. Reform 4 combines the positive effects. These are
described below.
4.1 Wages
Reform 1 lowers the wage rate, while reforms 2 and 3 have an insignificant
impact on the wage rate. The combined result, given by reform 4, represents
19
a wage decrease of about 6.7 %.
The wage rate is only influenced by the labor income tax. This is because
labor income taxation is taken into consideration during the wage negotia-
tions on the labor market. Other taxes do not affect the decisions of the
labor union or the employers’ federation. Despite the lower gross wage, the
change of the after-tax wage is insignificant. These effects are shown in the
chart below:
4.2 Employment
Reforms 1-3 all increase the employment. The combined effect, given by
reform 4, represents an increased employment rate of about 4.5 percentage
points.
Reform 1 decreases the wage, thus increasing the employment. The de-
creased capital income tax in reform 2 and consumption tax in reform 3
increase entrepreneurs’ incentives to employ workers. Thus, the bargaining
over employment leads to a slight improvement of the employment rate, de-
spite the unchanged wage. All reforms 1-3 support each other. These effects
are shown in the chart below:
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4.3 Capital stock
Reforms 1-3 all increase the capital stock. The combined effect, given by
reform 4, represents an increase of about 6.1 %.
Because labor and capital are complements, employment and capital stock
shift to the same direction following a tax decrease. These effects are shown
in the chart below:
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4.4 Gross Domestic Product
Reforms 1-3 all increase the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The combined
effect, given by reform 4, represents an increase of about 6.1 %.
The tax reforms influence GDP through labor and capital. These effects
are shown in the chart below:
4.5 The representative worker’s wealth
Reforms 1 and 2 both increase the representative worker’s wealth, while re-
form 3 decreases it. The combined effect, given by reform 4, represents an
increase of about 0.2 %.
The higher employment rate, due to the lower labor income tax in reform 1,
enables the representative worker to increase its wealth. The decrease of the
capital income tax in reform 2 directly encourages workers to increase their
wealth. Furthermore, because the lower capital income tax slightly increases
employment, keeping the wage unchanged, it increases the labor income of
the representative worker, encouraging the workers to increase their wealth.
The lower consumption tax rate in reform 3 discourages workers from saving,
thus decreasing their wealth. These effects are shown in the chart below:
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4.6 Private consumption
Reforms 1-3 all increase the consumption of the representative worker and
the representative entrepreneur. The combined effect, given by reform 4, is
beneficial for all households. It increases the workers’ consumption by about
2.3 % and the entrepreneurs’ consumption by about 25.6 %.
Because reforms 1 and 2 increase the employment rate, they increase the
representative worker’s income and therefore promote its consumption. How-
ever, the increase of income promotes saving more than consumption. The
decrease of the consumption taxation in reform 3 creates a strong incentive
for the workers to increase their consumption.
Reform 1 generates a higher GDP, encouraging the representative entrepreneur’s
consumption. The decrease of the capital income tax in reform 2 and that of
the consumption tax in reform 3 increases the representative entrepreneur’s
consumption directly. Furthermore, also reforms 2 and 3 increase the GDP,
positively affecting the representative entrepreneur’s consumption. These
effects are shown in the charts below:
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4.7 Welfare
Reforms 1 and 3 are good for both the workers’ and the entrepreneurs’ util-
ity. Reform 2 is bad for the workers, but good for the entrepreneurs. The
combined effect, given by reform 4, is positive for all households.
The utility of the representative worker is an increasing function of its con-
sumption, its wealth and government expenditures. With reform 1, the in-
crease of the consumption and wealth dominates over the effect of decreased
government expenditures, thus increasing the utility level. With reform 2,
24
the increases of consumption and wealth do not dominate over the effect of
decreased government expenditures. Reform 3 increases the utility level for
workers as their consumption faces a significant increase.
The utility of the representative entrepreneur depends directly on its con-
sumption. The changes are shown in the charts below, where the starting
levels of the utilities are normalized to 1.
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4.8 Discussion
In this paper, I examine the results of tax reforms combined with decreased
government expenditures. This is done by a model with collective bargaining,
an imperfect capital market with borrowing costs and adjustment costs of
investment. Such structural features are uncommon in the literature dealing
with taxation. Furthermore, papers considering tax reforms normally ignore
the effects of changed government expenditures.
Aronsson et al. (2002) argue that higher progressivity in labor income taxa-
tion causes a decrease of the Gross Domestic Product, the capital stock and
the private consumption. These changes resemble reform 1 in my paper. If a
higher progressivity of the labor income tax is interpreted as an increase of
the labor income tax rate, the results of Aronsson et al. (2002) correspond to
those of this paper, although they do not separate workers and entrepreneurs.
The findings of Aronsson et al. (2002) are in line with the results of Dı́az-
Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2011). These authors conclude that increasing
the labor income taxation leads to a smaller Gross Domestic Product, capi-
tal stock as well as a lower consumption. These findings are similar to those
of my paper, although I, in contrast to Dı́az-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2011),
distinguish between workers and entrepreneurs. A major difference between
my paper and that of Dı́az-Giménez and Pijoan-Mas (2011) is that their pa-
per uses a growth model, while I do not consider economic growth at all.
Altig et al. (2001) attempt to simplify the tax system so that all types of
income are taxed at the same rate. There are five different versions, mainly
depending on the extent of possible deductions. Although I do not consider
a situation where all types of income are taxed equally, the conclusions of
Altig et al. (2001) about the effect on the Gross Domestic Product and the
capital stock, are close to those in my paper. However, Altig et al. (2001) as-
sume perfect labor and capital markets, while I assume them to be imperfect.
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5 Conclusions
This paper discusses consequences of certain tax reforms. The tax system
consists of labor income, capital income and consumption taxes. The effects
are in terms of Gross Domestic Product, capital stock, the employment rate,
the wage rate, the representative worker’s wealth, private consumption and
the welfare of the households. This paper examines the effects of a reform,
where the government’s budget is balanced and the taxes on labor income,
capital income and consumption as well as government expenditures are de-
creased.
Decreasing the labor income tax, the capital income tax as well as the con-
sumption tax separately, combined with decreased government expenditures,
has positive effects on the Gross Domestic Product, the capital stock, the em-
ployment, the consumption of workers and entrepreneurs as well as the utility
of the entrepreneurs. However, the reforms’ effects on the workers’ wealth
are contradictory. The same concerns the workers’ utility.
Simultaneously decreasing the taxation of labor income, capital income and
consumption, combined with decreased government expenditures, increases
most economic indicators dealt with in this paper. The exception is the de-
creased gross wage. This negative effect is, however, compensated by the
lower labor income tax.
In contrast to most of the literature on taxation, I combine imperfect la-
bor and capital markets with an open economy. I show that a decreased tax
burden, combined with decreased government expenditures, has a number of
positive macroeconomic effects. Thus, the reforms examined in this paper
indicate what kind of policy actions could be of benefit to the economy.
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A Validity of Walras’ law
When checking if Walras’ law holds, one needs to consider the budget con-
straints of the representative worker, the representative entrepreneur and the
government as well as the capital market equation.
The budget constraint of the workers, according to equation (3), is
(1− Tπ)rW + (1− TL)Lw + (N − L)Z = (1 + TC)CW +W+1 −W. (32)
The budget constraint of the entrepreneurs, according to equation (18), is
(1− Tπ)
[
F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(




= (1 + TC)CE.
(33)
The budget constraint of the government, according to equation (29), is
TπrW + TLLw + TCCW + Tπ
[




−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(





= G+ (N − L)Z.
(34)
The capital market equation, according to equation (30), is
W +X = Q. (35)
Adding equations (32), (33) and (34), taking into consideration equation
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(35), leads to
(1− Tπ)rW + (1− TL)Lw + (N − L)Z+
+ (1− Tπ)
[
F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(




+ TπrW + TLLw
+ TCCW + Tπ
[
F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(





= (1 + TC)CW +W+1 −W + (1 + TC)CE +G+ (N − L)Z
⇔ rW + Lw + F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(
K+1 − (1− δ)K
)2
2K
= CW +W+1 −W + CE +G
⇔ F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −W+1 +W −Q−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(
K+1 − (1− δ)K
)2
2K
= r(Q−W ) + CW + CE +G




+K+1 − (1− δ)K +
κ
(





which describes the general goods market balance outside the steady state.
B Solving the Model
The model is below solved step-by-step. The production function F (A,K,L)




F (A∗, K∗, L∗) + FK(A






∗, K∗, L∗)(K −K∗)2 + FKL(A∗, K∗, L∗)(L− L∗)2
+ FLK(A




This means that any third or higher degree derivative of the production func-
tion must equal zero.
B.1 Labor market














Maximization with respect to w leads to
αν(1− TL)




⇔ αν(1− TL)(F (A,K,L)− wL)− (1− α)L
(
(1− TL)w − Z
)
= 0, (39)
where the expression for F (A,K,L) is given by equation (14).
Equation (39) is the optimality condition for the negotiated wage rate. To-
tally differentiating equation (39) with respect to w, K and Z generates
−
(
αν + 1− α
)
(1− TL)Ldw + αν(1− TL)FK(A,K,L)dK
+ (1− α)LdZ = 0.
(40)















(αν + 1− α)(1− TL)
. (42)
Based on equations (41) - (42), the wage rate can be expressed as
w(K,Z) (43)
Based on the production function (14), the expression for FK(A,K,L) in
















⇔ FK(A,K,L) = Aη[ηK
σ−1














































⇔ αµ(F (A,K,L)− wL) + (1− α)(FL(A,K,L)− w)L = 0, (46)
where the expression for F (A,K,L) is given by equation (14).
Based on production function (14), the expression for FL(A,K,L) in equation















⇔ FL(A,K,L) = A(1− η)[ηK
σ−1








































Equation (46) is the optimality condition for the negotiated amount of work-
ers to be employed by the entrepreneurs. Totally differentiating equation
(46) with respect to L and K generates[










= − αµFK(A,K,L) + (1− α)FLK(A,K,L)L
(αµ+ 1− α)(FL(A,K,L)− w) + (1− α)FLL(A,K,L)L
, (49)
where the expression for FK(A,K,L) is given by equation (44) and the
expression for FL(A,K,L) by equation (47). Based on equation (49), the
amount of employed workers can be expressed as
L(K). (50)
Based on equation (47), the expression for FLL(A,K,L) in equation (49) can
be received from the following calculation:
















σ + A(1− η)[ηK
σ−1

































Furthermore, based on equation (47), the expression for FLK(A,K,L) in
equation (49) can be received from the following calculation:











































Differentiating equation (53) with regard to L gives the expression for FLL(A,K,L)






















Differentiating equation (53) with regard toK gives the expression for FLK(A,K,L)












Furthermore, the optimality conditions (39) and (46) can be combined as per
the below calculation:




(1− TL)w − Z
)
= 0
⇔ ν(1− TL)(FL(A,K,L)− w) + µ
(
(1− TL)w − Z
)
= 0. (56)
B.2 Entrepreneurs’ stock of capital and debt; workers’
wealth
When choosing the stock of capital K+1 and debt Q+1 the state variables of
the representative entrepreneur are Tπ, TC , r, Q and K. Based on (19) and
(20), the maximization problem takes the following form:














F (A,K,L) +Q+1 −Q− wL− rQ−
γQ2
2K
−K+1 + (1− δ)K −
κ
(





The production function F (A,K,L) is expressed by formula (14), β = 1
1+ρ
is the discount factor and ρ is the rate of time preference.
Maximization of the value function (57) with respect to K+1, taking into















The capital stock K+1 is dependent on the previous capital stock K, i.e. K+1
can be expressed as the decision rule K+1(K). Now the value function (57)
is differentiated with respect to K, keeping the decision rule K+1(K) and
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and substituting the received equation into the first-order condition (58),




















FK(A+1, K+1, L+1) +
(








+ 1− δ +
κ
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αµYK,+1 + (1− α)YLK,+1L+1
)
(αµ+ 1− α)(YL,+1 − w+1) + (1− α)YLL,+1L+1
− ανYK,+1


















where the expression for YK,+1
.
= FK(A+1, K+1, L+1) is based on equation
(44), the expression for YL,+1
.
= FL(A+1, K+1, L+1) is based on equation
(47), the expression for YLL,+1
.
= FLL(A+1, K+1, L+1) is based on equation
(51) and the expression for YLK,+1
.
= FLK(A+1, K+1, L+1) is based on equa-
tion (52).
Equation (60) is the optimality condition for the representative entrepreneur’s
capital stock. Based on equations (19) and (60), the capital stock can be ex-
pressed as
K+1(K,Q, Tπ, TC , r) (61)
Maximization of the value function (57) with respect to Q+1, taking into







The stock of debt Q+1 is dependent on the previous stock of debt Q, i.e.
Q+1 can be expressed as the decision rule Q+1(Q). Now the value function
(57) is differentiated with respect to Q, keeping the decision rule Q+1(Q) and

















= − (1− Tπ)
CE(1 + TC)
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= − (1− Tπ)
CE(1 + TC)
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Forwarding equation (63) by one period generates
∂VE,+1
∂Q+1
= − (1− Tπ,+1)
CE,+1(1 + TC,+1)
[




and substituting the received equation into the first-order condition (62),






(1 + ρ)CE,+1(1 + TC,+1)
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⇔ (1− Tπ)(1 + ρ)CE,+1(1 + TC,+1)
− (1− Tπ,+1)CE(1 + TC)
[






Equation (64) is the optimality condition for the representative entrepreneur’s
decision concerning borrowing. Based on equations (19) and (64), the deci-
sion concerning the stock of debt of the representative entrepreneur can be
expressed as
Q+1(Q,K, Tπ, TC , r) (65)
When choosing the wealth W+1 the state variables of the representative
worker are TL, Tπ, TC , r, Z, g, W and W . Based on (4) and (5), the
maximization problem becomes




CWf(g) + ϕ(lnW − lnN − lnW )














(1− TL)Lw + (N − L)Z
(1 + TC)
and β = 1
1+ρ
being the discount factor and ρ the rate of time preference.







Based on the first-order condition (67), the wealth W+1 is dependent on W ,
i.e. W+1 can be expressed as the decision rule W+1(W ). Now the value
function (66) is differentiated with respect to W , keeping the decision rule
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and substituting the received equation into the first-order condition (67),































Equation (69) is the Euler equation for the representative worker.
C Comparative statics
The comparative statics analysis will here be performed by first collecting the
steady state equations and then utilizing a numerical mathematical calcula-
tion program. The following budget constraints, utility functions, optimality
conditions and market equilibrium conditions will be transformed into their
steady state counterparts: (3), (5), (6), (8), (18), (20), (22), (23), (28), (29),
(30) and (31).
Based on equation (3), the steady state budget for the representative worker
is expressed by
(1− T ∗π )r∗W ∗ + (1− T ∗L)L∗w∗ + (N∗ − L∗)Z∗ = (1 + T ∗C)C∗W +W ∗ −W ∗
38
⇔ (1− T ∗π )r∗W ∗ + (1− T ∗L)L∗w∗ + (N∗ − L∗)Z∗ − (1 + T ∗C)C∗W = 0. (70)
Based on equations (5), (6) and the fact that g = G
CW
, the steady state utility
of the representative worker can be expressed by
U∗W − C∗W
[






χ−1 − ϕ(lnW ∗ − lnN∗ − lnW ∗) = 0. (71)
Applying steady state values to the Euler equation for the representative
worker, i.e. equation (8) and taking into consideration equation (6), g = G
CW
and the fact that β = 1
1+ρ
the following calculation is received
f(g∗)(1 + ρ)




1 + (1− T ∗π )r∗
)




⇔ f(g∗)(1 + ρ)W ∗ = f(g∗)
(
1 + (1− T ∗π )r∗
)
W ∗ + ϕ(1 + T ∗C)
⇔ f(g∗)ρW ∗ = f(g∗)(1− T ∗π )r∗W ∗ + ϕ(1 + T ∗C)
⇔
[








ρ− (1− T ∗π )r∗
)
− ϕ(1 + T ∗C) = 0. (72)
Based on equation (18), the steady state budget for the representative en-
trepreneur is received by the calculation below:
(1− T ∗π )
[
Y ∗ +Q∗ −Q∗ − w∗L∗ − r∗Q∗ − γ(Q
∗)2
2K∗
−K∗ + (1− δ)K∗ −
κ
(




= (1 + T ∗C)C
∗
E
⇔ (1− T ∗π )
[
Y ∗ − w∗L∗ − r∗Q∗ − γ(Q
∗)2
2K∗




= (1 + T ∗C)C
∗
E
⇔ (1− T ∗π )
[











− (1 + T ∗C)C∗E = 0,
(73)
where the expression for F (A,K,L) is given by equation (14).
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Based on equation (20), the steady state utility of the representative en-
trepreneur can be expressed by
U∗E − lnC∗E = 0. (74)
The entrepreneur’s optimality condition for the capital stock (22) in steady
state is received by the calculation below:








Y ∗L − w∗
)(
αµY ∗K + (1− α)Y ∗LKL∗
)




























⇔ Y ∗K +
γ(Q∗)2
2(K∗)2
+ 1− δ −
(
Y ∗L − w∗
)(
αµY ∗K + (1− α)Y ∗LKL∗
)

















⇔ Y ∗K +
γ(Q∗)2
2(K∗)2
+ 1− δ −
(
Y ∗L − w∗
)(
αµY ∗K + (1− α)Y ∗LKL∗
)




αν + 1− α
+ κδ(1− δ) + κδ
2
2
= (1 + ρ)(1 + κδ)
⇔ Y ∗K +
γ(Q∗)2
2(K∗)2
+ 1− δ −
(
Y ∗L − w∗
)(
αµY ∗K + (1− α)Y ∗LKL∗
)




αν + 1− α
+ κδ − κδ2 + κδ
2
2
= 1 + κδ + ρ+ ρκδ
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Y ∗L − w∗
)(
αµY ∗K + (1− α)Y ∗LKL∗
)




αν + 1− α
− δ − κδ
2
2
− ρ− ρκδ = 0,
(75)
where the expression for YK
.
= FK(A,K,L) is given by equation (44), the
expression for YL
.
= FL(A,K,L) is given by equation (47), the expression
for YLL
.
= FLL(A,K,L) is given by equation (51) and the expression for
YLK
.
= FLK(A,K,L) is given by equation (52).
The entrepreneur’s optimality condition for the stock of debt (23) in steady
state is received by the calculation below:
(1− T ∗π )(1 + ρ)C∗E(1 + T ∗C)
= (1− T ∗π )C∗E(1 + T ∗C)
[




⇔ 1 + ρ = 1 + r∗ + γ Q
∗
K∗
⇔ (ρ− r∗)K∗ − γQ∗ = 0. (76)
The combined optimality condition for the labor market (28) in steady state
is
ν(1− T ∗L)(Y ∗L − w∗) + µ
(
(1− T ∗L)w∗ − Z∗
)
= 0, (77)
where the expression for YL
.
= FL(A,K,L) is given by equation (47).
Based on equation (29), the steady state budget for the government is ex-
pressed by
T ∗πr
∗W ∗ + T ∗LL






Y ∗ +Q∗ −Q∗ − w∗L∗
− r∗Q∗ − γ(Q
∗)2
2K∗
−K∗ + (1− δ)K∗ −
κ
(







∗ + (N − L∗)Z∗
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⇔ T ∗πr∗W ∗ + T ∗LL∗w∗ + T ∗CC∗W + T ∗π
[














E −G∗ − (N − L∗)Z∗ = 0.
(78)
Based on equation (30), the steady state equation for the capital market is:
W ∗ +X∗ −Q∗ = 0. (79)
The steady state version of the goods market equilibrium condition, based
on equations (31) and (79), is
X∗ −X∗ + Y ∗ = r∗X∗ + C∗W + C∗E +G∗ +
γ(Q∗)2
2K∗




K∗ − (1− δ)K∗
)2
2K∗


















where the expression for Y
.
= F (A,K,L) is given by equation (14).
Based on the equations (70) - (78), and (80), the following system of steady
state equations is received:
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χ−1 − ϕ(lnW ∗ − lnN∗ − lnW ∗) = 0 .= f 2
[









ρ− (1− T ∗π )r∗
)
− ϕ(1 + T ∗C) = 0
.
= f 3
(1− T ∗π )
[











− (1 + T ∗C)C∗E = 0
.
= f 4





















αν+1−α − δ −
κδ2
2
−ρ− ρκδ = 0 .= f 6
(ρ− r∗)K∗ − γQ∗ = 0 .= f 7
ν(1− T ∗L)(Y ∗L − w∗) + µ
(






∗W ∗ + T ∗LL



















E −G∗ − (N − L∗)Z∗ = 0
.
= f 9












where the formulas for Y ∗
.
= F (A∗, K∗, L∗), Y ∗K
.
= FK(A




∗, K∗, L∗), Y ∗LL
.
= FLL(A
∗, K∗, L∗) and for Y ∗LK
.
= FLK(A
∗, K∗, L∗) are
based on the CES production function from (14).
43
References
Altig, David; Auerbach, Alan J.; Kotlikoff, Laurence J.; Smetters, Kent A.
and Walliser, Jan. Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the United
States. The American Economic Review vol. 91, no. 3 (2001): 574-595.
Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco; Ngo, Van Long and Poschke, Markus. Capi-
tal Labor Substitution, Structural Change, and the Labor Income Share.
CIRANO - Scientific Publications 2014 nr 2 (2014).
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